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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to § 78-2a-3(a), Ltah
Code Annotated.
STATEMENT OK ISSUES ANT) STANDARD OF REVIEW
U Issue No. 1:
Did the Administrate Law Judge commit an error of law b\ informing:
Appellant that he could only ha\e one witness at the telephonic hearing held on the 5 '
day of July. 2000.
I FN issue is one of constitutional magnitude and is based upon the ArpelhuusN
right :o due process under Article I. Section VIE I 'tali Constitution, lor the right to
present witnesses. The standard of review is thai the appellate court shall erant relief
'Mii;. :!. on ;he basis of the agency N record, it determines that a pernor, seeki":; :i;d.cial
re\ iew has been substantially prejudiced by the agency action, or the statute or rtiie or.
which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; the auenc\
has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; or the agency has emeaex'd in an unlawful
procedure or decision-making process, has tailed to follow prescribed procedure: or the
agency action is arbitrary or capricious. ^ (>3-4dh-16(a)(d)(e) and (Id. U.C.A.
"Uue^tions regarding whether an administrate e agenc\ ha.s afforded a wtiiioner dae
proces> m its hearings are questions ol law. \\ e therefore do not ju\ e deference to the
agency's actions." Lope/ v. Career Serv. Review Bd.. 834 P.2d 5dK. 5" 1 iI 'tali Ct.
App.). cert, denied. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992).
This issue is not in the record as the telephone call Appellant had with the
Administrative Law Judge was prior to the telephonic hearing. The telephone
conversation was mentioned during the telephonic hearine. (R. 26. p. 12. 11, I5-2i)i
2. Issue No. 2:
Did the Workforce Appeals Board make an error of law by their failure to allow
the Appellant to reopen evidence to allow the Appellant the opportunity to ha\c his one
witness allowed by the Administrative Law Judge heard.
Ihis issue is one of constitutional magnitude and is based upon the Appellants's
right to due process under .Article 1. Section VIE I hah Constitution, lor the riszht to
present witnesses. The standard of review is that the appellate court shall erant relief
only if. on the basis of the agency "s record, it determines that a person seeking indicia!
review has been substantially prejudiced by the agencv action, or the statute or rule on
which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; the agency
has erroneously interpreted or applied the law: or the agency has engaged in an unlawful
procedure or decision-makmg process, has failed to follow prescribed procedure; or the
agency action is arbitrary or capricious. §§ 63-46b-16(a)(d)(e) and (h). U.C.A.
"(Questions regarding whether an administrative agency has afforded a petitioner duo
process in its Iiearings are questions of law. We iherefore do not ai\e deference to die
agency's actions." Eo£^vJ7ajvej:_SejTJ<^ ^34 p 2d 568. 5~l '( lah Ct
App.). cert, denied. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992).
This issue was preserved by the Appellant. (R. 34: R. 40)
3. Issue No. 3:
Did the e\ idence adequately support the Administrative Law Judge's fmdnuis jnd
tiltimate determination on the issties of Appellant's termination versus voluntarib
quitting employment with "I radition Builders. Inc?
'I he standard of review" is that the appellate court shall grant relief onh if. on the
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial re\ iew has been
substantially prejudiced by the agency action, or the statute or rule on which, the ai:enc\
action j> based, the agency action is based upon a determination of tact, made or implied
by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when \iewed in hchii of the
whose record betore the court: or the agenc\ action is arbitran or capricious. sv; o--4n'h-
; oi a hg i and ih ). 1'.C.A.
This issue was preserved by the Appellant before the administrative aieenc\. (R.
26 p. "" 11, ^ and 16)
4. Issue No. 4:
\\ as it proper to assess Appellant civil penalties pursuant to ^ 35A-4-4i>5"o ) and
35A-4-4on4i following July ~\ \L)i)LK when there was no evidence o\ fraud on ids oar;
follow ingjune 25. 1999"
1he standard of review is that the appellate court shall grant relief oniy if. mi the
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been
substantially prejudiced by the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the a«ency
action is based, the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied
by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in liuhl of the
whole record before the coart; or the agency action is arbitrary or capricious. ^ 63-4db-
lOiaiig) and (h). U.C.A.
This issue was preserved by the Appellant. (R. 36-37; R. 26 p. 7 1. 4)
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. RULES
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, ARTICLE I, SECTION VII:
Section 7, |Due process of Law.] No person shall be deprived of life, libern or
property. withoul due process of law ,
SECTION 63-46b-8, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED:
(1nd) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to present
evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit rebuttal e\ide:ice.
SECTION 63-46b-16, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED:
i4 i Fhe appellate court shall grant relief only if. on the basis of the asienc\ "s
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantial'^
preiiuliced by any of the following-
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agcnc\ action is based.
:s unconstitutional on its face or as applied.
(hi the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred b\ an\ statute:
(cj the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution:
idi the agency erroneously interpreted or applied the law.
ie) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making:
process, or has tailed to follow prescribed procedure:
i fi the persons taking the agency action were illegalh constituted as a decision
making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied b\
the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
whole record before the court,
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of discretion delegated to the agencv bv statute:
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency:
(iii) contrary ;o the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for
ihe inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
Section 35A-4-405(5)(c):
(e) Each individual found in violation of Subsection (5) shall rcpav to the
commission the amount of benefits the c'aimant actually recei\ed and. as a ci\il penalty,
an amount equal to the benefits the claimant received by direct reason of his fraud. "1 he
penalty amount shall be regarded as any other penalty under this chapter. These amounts
shall be collectible by civil action or warrant in the manner provided in Subsections 3>
4-305(3 ) and (5).
Section 35A-4-406(4)(a) & (b):
i4t<a) Any person who. by reason of his fraud, has recei\ed an\ sum as benefits
under this chapter to which he was not entitled shall repay the sum to the commission tor
-<->-
the fund.
(b) Any person who. by reason of his fault, has received any sum as benefits
under this chapter to which under a redetermination or decision pursuant to this section
he has been found not entitled, he shall repay the sum. or shall, in the discretion of the
commission, have the sum deducted from any future benefits payable to him. or both.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Nature of the Case:
This appeal is from the decisions of the Department of Workforce Services, more
specifically the Decision of the Administrative Law Judge entered on or about July 19. 2000 and
the Decision of Workforce Appeals Board, entered on or about September 21. 200(1 yvhich
adopted the Administrative Law Judge's decision..
2. Course of Proceedings:
Following entry of the Decision of Workforce Appeals Board entered on or about
September 2 1. 2000. the Appellant filed a Petition for Review of the Agency's actions.
The Petition for Review was filed on October 2 1. 2000.
3. Statement of Facts:
a. Appellant was employed by Norm's Concrete through hmploy Lase ihroimh the
end of 1998.
b. Appellant filed a claim and sought unemployment benefits from March 28. 1999.
Appellant was awarded a benefit amount of $298 per week for 23 weeks. (R. 1 - 2)
c. Appellant was employed by Tradition Builders, Inc., also through bmplov base,
from May 27. 1999 to June 25. 1999.
d. Appellant answered "no" to the question on the Teleclaim for the weeks endinu
May 29. 1999 through June 26. 1999 that he had not worked nor had he had any earnings
through said period. (R. 1)
e. On June 25. 1999. Appellant (a mason) and his son (a noddy) were laid off at the
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end of the day by the owner of Tradition Builders. Inc.. Alan Neill. Mr. Neill informed
Appellant and his son that he was out of work and that he would attempt to reorganize.
Present at the time yyere Appellant, his son. a co-worker 'ferry Thompson and Mr. Neill.
Iyler said that there were too many employees for the amount of work, iR. 2o . p. ". p.
16. 42 MR. 26. p. 15. IF 17-20)
g. Mr. Terry Thompson worked one additional day for Tradition Builders. Inc.. and
was laid off at the end of said extra day. (R. 26. p. 15. 11. 17-20)
h. The Appellant did not work lor 'Fradition Builders, Inc.. after that date. (R. 26. p.
S. 11. }fr-?~)
;. Iradition Builders. Inc.. by and through its President. Alan Neill. dratted a letter
dated May 18. 200(1. which indicated that the company laid off two empkwces. one o\
winch was the .Appellant's son. 1he letter goes on and indicates that the Appellant quit
>how ing up for work and ne\ er came back w ithin day s of the lay off of his. son i K. " i
j. Ihe Department o\' Workforce Sen ices sent the Appellant a "Notice ol Lvsuc'"
dated May 8. 2000. (R. 5- 6)
k. .Appellant contested the same by telephoning the Department of Workforce on or
about May 15. 2000. (R. 10)
I. A hearing in this matter wa-. set tor July 5. 2000 based upon the Appellant A
seeking re\ lew of the decision of the BPC 1tearing <ifficer. i R. 18-2 1
m. Appellant called Ferry J. Lump. Administrate e I aw Judge, prior to :hc
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scheduled hearing to find out how the hearing would proceed due to the Appellant
Inning several witnesses that were available by telephone. The Administrative Law-
Judge informed the Appellant that only one witness would be allowed and for the
Appellant to decide which of his witnesses was the best. (R. 26. p. 12. 1. 15 )
n. Based on what the Administratiye I aw Judge said. Appellant determined that
1erry 1hompson was the best witness and informed his other witnesses that Ihex were
not needed. (R. 26. p. 12. 11. 22-32)
o. Mr. Thompson was not available when he was called as he had left the mobile
telephone with his employer when Mr. Thompson had to go to another job site. (R. 2d.
p.12. 11. 5-13)
p. At the hearing helo on July 5. 2(K»0. Mr. Neill indicated that he indeed fired two
people, the Appellant's son and Ierry Thompson. Mr. Neill indicated that the Appellant
was present and could in fact have belicwed that the Appellant was also laid off or bred.
(R. 26. p. 9. 1. 27; R. 26. p. 8. 1. 37)
q. Appellant requested that the proceedings be continued so that he could »et his
witness to testify and he also sought from the Workforce Appeals Board the opportunity
nf presenting said evidence. Neither time were Appellant's requests granted iR. 34. '^v
3 7.45)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Issue No. 1:
Ihe Administrative Faw Judge \iolated the Appellant's right to due process a>
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and State of Utah, when he informed
the Appellant prior to the telephonic hearing that he could only have one witness at the
hearing. The Administratis e Law Judge also violated Section 63-46b-S( d i.
2. Issue No. 2:
1he Workforce Appeals Board violated the Appellant's right to due process as
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and State of Utah, yvhen they failed
to allow the Appellant to reopen evidence and have his one witnes.s that the
Administrative Law Judge allowed became una\ailable at the telephonic hearine; due to
^u'cunistances beyond the Appellant's con'roh '1 he Workforce Appeals Board also
violated Section 65-46b-8uL.
3. Issue No. 3:
Ihe substantial weight of the evidence was that the Appellant was fired or thought
he yyas tired and that he did not voluntarily terminate his employment with Fradition
Builders. Inc. Additional evidence would have been introduced had the Administrative
Faw Judge not informed the Appellant that he could only hay e one witness and if die one
witness, would have been allowed to testis if the matter had been reopened.
4. Issue No. 4:
The substantial weight of the evidence was that the Appellant was fired or thought
he was tired and that he did not voluntarily terminate his employment with "I radition
Builders. Inc. Again, additional evidence could have been presented absent the due
process violation by the Administrative Faw Judge. No evidence was preserted that the
Appellant committed fraud and therefore the award of the civil penalty following Jul\ A
1999 pursuant to §35A-4-4()5(5) and §35A-4-406(4) should be stricken.
ARGUMENT
I. Issue No. 1:
I'he Administrative Law Judge violated the Appellant's right to due process as
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and State of Utah, when he informed
the Appellant prior to the telephonic hearing that he couid only have one witness at the
hearing. This also violate^ 63-46b-S(d). as the Appellant was therefore not given the
opportunity to present vita evidence which went to the central issue.
Ihe Appellant called the Administrative Law Judge prior to the telephonic hearing
to find out how to arrange for three witnesses (Terry Thompson to testify that Alan Neill
terminated Appellant and his son on the day in question and that Mr. Ihompson was not
terminated until a day later by Mr. Neill: Cameron Lsplin to testify that Mr, Neill
terminated him and the Appellant and not Mr. Thompson on the dav in question: a third
parry who was also terminated later on due to the lack of work and too manv employees
[Rod Schneider]). The Administrative Law Judge informed the Appellant that he could
only present his best witness on the issue of whether he was terminated or voluntarily
quit. Appellant therefore told two of his witnesses. Rod Schneider and his son (Cameron
Fsplmi that they would not he needed. At the time of the hearing Mr. Ihompson became
unavailable when he was forced to leave the job site where telephone arrangements had
been made to go to a different job site where a telephone was not available.
'I his not only violates Article 1. Section VII. of the constitution bv depnv me the
Appellant a property and liberty interest without due process but also ij63-46h-8(d). of
the Administrative Procedures Act. Appellant would request the opportunity to present
at least two of the three witnesses he had arranged to testify so that the auenev can test
the sufficiency of the facts in light of all relevant and material evidence.
2. Issue No. 2:
I he Workforce Appeals Board violated the Appellant's riuh; to due process js
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and State of I hah. when he denied
the Appellant the opportunity to reopen the evidence to allow the Appellant":- witnesses
that were unavailable due to either moving to a job site where a telephone was
unavailable in the case of Terry Thompson, or was told that thev were not "oine to he
allowed to testify in the case of Cameron 1 spin: and the Rod Schneider part'- to 'eMify.
1he sole nasi-, lor the Workforce Appeals Board denial was that it would anduh. burden
the department and opposing parties, iR. -in i ['hi-, also violated o3-4ob-8i d i. as tiie
Appellant was therefore not given the opportunity to present vital evidence which went
to the centra] issue.
The Appellant called the Administrative Law Judge prior to the telephonic hearing
lo find out how to arrange lor three witnesses (1 erry 1hompson to testify that .Alan Neill
terminated Appellant and his son on the day in question and that Mr. Thompson was not
terminated until a day later by Mr. Neill: Cameron Lsplin to testify that Mr. Neill
terminated him and the Appellant and not Mr. Thompson on the da\ in question: a third
party who was also terminated later on due to the lack of work and too many employees).
1he Administrative Law Judge informed the Appellant that he could onlv present his best
witness on the issue of whether he was terminated or voluntarily quit. Appellant
therefore told two of his witnesses, the third party and his son (Cameron Lsplin) that they
would not be needed. At the time of the hearing Mr. Fhompson became unavailable
when he was forced to leave the job site where telephone arrangements had been made to
go to a different job site where a telephone was not available.
The Appellant requested the reopening of evidence in light of the lack of evidence
due to the Administrative F.aw Judge As rule that Appellant could onlv have one witness
testify regarding the issue of termination versus voluntarily quitting.
Ihis not only violates Article I. Section VII. of the constitution bv dcpnvma the
Appellant a property and linerty interest without due process but also sj63-4db-Sd.li. ot'
the Administrative Procedures Act. .Appellant would request the opportune to present
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at least two of the three witnesses he had arranged to testify so that the agency can test
the sufficiency of the facts in light of all relevant and material evidence.
3. Issue No. 3:
'The substantial weight of the evidence was that the Appellant wu.s tired or thoueht
he was fired and that he did not voluntarily terminate his employment with 1radition
Builders. Inc. Additional e\ idence w ould have been introduced had the Administrativ e
1 aw Judge not informed the Appellant that he could only have one witness and if the ^)nc
vwtness would have been allowed to testify if the matter had been reopened.
"I he e\ idence presented by the Appellant was that Mr. Neill did in fact terminate
two employees on the date in question, the Appellant and his son. Cameron 1 .spiin. (R.
2'\ p. U 1. 16i l.ven Mr. Neill testified that he terminated onlv two employees on the
d.:te in question. ( R. 26. p. S. IF 33-5" i See also letter dated 5-1 S-<N' AC ~ i 1em
I hompson remained employed for at least one additional dav before he was terminated
[R. 26. p. 15. IF 17-20) "Ferry Thompson and Cameron Lsplin would have testifed
consistent with Appellant and clarified the sequence of terminations of the Appellant.
Mr 1hompson and Cameron Lsplin. had they been allowed to testily . See Issues No. 1
and 2. supra.
Flven had Mr. Neill terminated Mr. I hompson and Cameron Hsplin. lie indicated
thai Appellant was present at that time and could hav e believ ed (hat he was ako
terminated. (R. 20. p. 8. 1. 3": R. 2o. p. 9. 1. 2") Mr. Fhompson showed up lor am
additional days work before he was terminated. (R. 26. p. 15. 11 17-20) Why would Mr.
Thompson have shown up and why would Mr. Neill have put him to work if he had been
terminated the day before'? Simple, because he was not the one terminated on the da\
before Appellant was!
4. Issue No. 4:
The substantia] weight of the evidence at the hearing was that Appellant was
terminated or believed he was terminated. (R. 26. p. 7. 1 4 and 16: R. 20 p. S. IF 3^-3~:
R. 26. p. 9. 1. 27: R. 26. p. 15. IF 17-20) No evidence was presented that would support
the finding of fraud which is necessary for the civil penalties pursuant to ^35A-4-405(5 ]
and 55A-4-406(4) to attach.
Appellant requests that the civ 11 penalties be stricken from and after Julv A LA'C
CONCLUSION
Appellant was informed that he could only present one witness at the luh 5. 20()(i
telephonic hearing by the Administrative Law Judge. Appellant therefore informed two
ot his witnesses that they were not going to be allowed to testify and that thev did not
need to stay by the telephone. This violated the Appellants due process rights under
Section VII ofArticle 1. Constitution of I tab. as well as , Ihe Workforce Appeals Board
also violated Appellants right and exacerbated the Administrative Law JuducA actions
bv failing to reopen the ev idence on the central issue. Appellant requests that the matter
be reopened and that he be allowed to present testimony of his three witnesses on the
-16-
central isstie of termination versus voluntarily quitting.
The substantial weight of the evidence, even in light of the denial of Appellant's
witnesses, was that the Appellant and his son were terminated, that Mr. Thompson
worked an additional day and then was terminated, andor that Appellant believed lie was
terminated. Fhe decision that the Appellant voluntarily quit should be reversed as should
the finding that the Appellant committed fraud and the imposition of a civ il penally alter
July ". UA!0. should therefore be stricken..
LJAIHD this 3rd dav of Januan. 2001.
Ty ler Hsplin. Appellant
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
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Salt Lake City. Utah 84145-0244
Personnel Department
Employ Ease
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Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062-9220
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ADDENDUM
ARTICLE I. SECTION VII, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH:
Section 7. |L)ue process of Law. | No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
SECTION 63-46b-8. UTAH C ODE ANNOTATED:
63-4nb-8. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings Hearing rroeedure
(1) Except as provided in subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i) and (hi. in all formal
adjudicative proceedings, a hearing shall be conducted as follows:
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to obtain full
disclosure ol relevant facts and to afford all the parties reasonable opportunity to present
their positions.
ibt On his own motion or upon objection by a party, the presiding officer:
(.1) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduK
repetitious:
(ii) shall exclude e\ idence priv ileged in the courts of I 'tain:
(hi) may receive documentary evidence in the form of a copy of excerpt if
the copy or excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the original iFvair.cn::
Iiv) may take official notice of any facts that could he judichdA noticed un
the 1hah Rules oi~ Evidence, of the record of other proceedings before the agency. and o\~
technical or scientific facts within the agency A .specialized knowledge.
ici The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solelv because it is hearsay.
(di The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to present
evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit rebuttal evidence.
(ei The presiding officer may give persons not a party to the adjudicativ L-
proceeding the opportunity to present oral or written statements at the hearing.
i f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if offered as ev idence to be
considered m reaching a decision on the merits, shall be given under oath.
(g) ITie hearing shall be recorded at the agenev's expense.
An any party, at his own expense, may have a person approved '" the agc:ic\
prepare a transcript of the hearing, subject to any restrictions that the agencv is permitted
bv statute to impose to protect confidential information disclosed at the hearing
iii All hearing shall be open to dl\ parties.
(2 l 1his section does not preclude the presiding oflicer from taking appropriate
measures necessary to preserve the integrity of the hearing.
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SECTION 63-46M6, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED:
63-466-16. Judicial revaew - Eormal adjudicative proceedings.
(1)As prov ided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court oF Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all Final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agenev action
with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the
appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall gov ern all
additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) Fhe contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review
of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, except that:
(aI all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost ol'preparing transcripts and copies for
the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten,
summarize, or organize tin. record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) Fhe appellate court shall grant relief only if. on the basis of the agenev A
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agenev action is based.
is unconstitutional on its face or as applied:
<b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred bv am statute:
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution:
id) the agency erroneously interpreted or applied the law.
u\) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making
process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure:
if) the persons taking the agenev action were illegally constituted as a decision
making body or were subject to disqualification:
ig> the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied bv
the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
whole record before the court.
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(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of discretion delegated to the agency by statute:
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for
the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
SECTION 35A-4-405, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED:
Section 35A-4-405(5):
(5 )(a) For each week with respect to which the claimant wilfully made a false
statement or representation or knowingly failed to report a material fact to obtain anv
benefit under the provisions of this chapter, and an additional 13 weeks for the first week
the statement or representation was made or fact withheld and six weeks for each week
thereafter: the additional weeks not to exceed 49 weeks.
tb) The additional period shall commence on the Sunday following the
issuance of a determination finding the claimant in violation of Subsection (5 i.
(ci Each individual found in violation of Subsection (5) shall repay to the
commission the amount of benefits the claimant actually received and. as a civil penalty.
an amount equal to the benefits the claimant received by direct reason of his fraud. The
penalty amount shall be regarded as any other penalty under this chapter. These amounts
shall be collectible by civil action or warrant in the manner provided in Subsections 35-
4-3(15(3) and (5).
(d) A claimant is ineligible for future benefits or waiting week credit, and anv
wage credits earned by the claimant shall be unavailable for purpose of paving benefits.
if any amount owed under Subsection (5) remains unpaid.
(e) Determinations under Subsection (5) shall be made onl\ upon a sworn
written admission of the claimant or after due notice and recorded hearing. If a claimant
waives the recorded hearing, a determination shall be made based upon all the facts that
the commission, exercising due diligence, has obtained. Determinations bv the
commission are appealable in the manner provided by this chapter for appeals from other
benefit determinations.
SECTION 35A-4-406, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED:
Section 35A-4-406(4):
(4)(a.) Any person who. by reason ofbis fraud, has received anv sum as benefits
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under this chapter to which he was not entitled shall repay the sum to the commission for
the fund.
(b) Any person who, by reason of his fault, has received any sum as benefits
under this chapter to which under a redetennination or decision pursuant to this section
he has been found not entitled, he shall repay the sum. or shall, in the discretion of the
commission, have the sum deducted from any future benefits payable to him. or both.
(c) In any case in which under this subsection a claimant is liable to repav to the
commission any sum for the fund, the sum shall be collectible in the same manner as
provided for contributions due under this chapter.
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